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The Unfair Immigration-Related Employment
Practices Provision: A Modicum of
Protection Against National Origin and
Citizenship Status Discrimination.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The employer sanctions provision of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)' imposes penalties on employers
who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens or who fail to comply with
the Act's employment verification system.2 This provision, envisioned as the principal means of curtailing the large influx of undocumented aliens into the United States,3 has elicited strong negative
reaction from employers, minority groups, and members of Congress.
Employers object because they are now subject to both civil and criminal penalties for failing to comply with the Act's stringent, and
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCA].
2. The IRCA provides that "[i]t
is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to
recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States-(A) an alien knowing the alien
is an unauthorized alien [or] (B) an individual without complying with the requirements of
subsection (b)." IRCA § 274(a)(1). Subsection (b) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person
or other entity hiring, recruiting, or referring an individual for employment in the United
States... must attest, under penalty of perjury and on a form designated or established by the
Attorney General by regulation, that it has verified that the individual is not an unauthorized
alien." IRCA § 274A(b)(1)(a). Verification requires examination of certain documents, such
as a United States passport, certificate of United States citizenship, certificate of naturalization,
unexpired foreign passport, if endorsed by the Attorney General, or a resident alien card.
Certain documents, including a social security card, certificate of birth, or other documents
established by regulation, may satisfy this requirement, provided they are accompanied by a
driver's license, state identification card, or other document established by regulation. IRCA
§ 274A(b)(1)(A-D).
3. Indicative of the severe problem of controlling illegal immigration, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) predicted that 1.7 million undocumented aliens would be
apprehended during the 1986 fiscal year. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 47,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649. Immigration officials assert that
this figure represents only a "small fraction of those who cross the border successfully and stay
in the United States for years, [or] for a season." Id. In 1985, the INS apprehended 1.2
million undocumented aliens; in six of the past nine years, more than 1 million illegal aliens
have been apprehended. Id.
The House Committee on the Judiciary reported that "[e]mployment is the magnet that
attracts aliens here illegally or, in the case of nonimmigrants, leads them to accept
employment in violation of their status. Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this
legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering
illegally or violating their status in search of employment." Id. at 46.
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arguably cumbersome, regulations. 4 Furthermore, Congress has, in
effect, deputized employers as an adjunct enforcement arm of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).5
Minority groups, 6 civil rights groups,7 and members of Congress'

fear that employers will discriminate against Hispanic Americans,
4. For violating the IRCA's prohibition against the employment of unauthorized aliens,
employers may be subject to money penalties ranging from $250 to $10,000 per violation.
IRCA § 274A(e)(4)(i-iii). Penalties for failing to comply with the Act's verification procedures
range from $100 to $1,000 per violation. IRCA § 274A(e)(5). An employer who engages in a
"pattern or practice" of violations is subject to criminal penalties of up to 6 months
imprisonment or fines of up to $3,000 per violation, or both. IRCA § 274A(f)(1).
Additionally, the Attorney General may seek to enjoin such practices in federal district court.
IRCA § 274A(f)(2).
5. Employer sanctions "compel the employer to assume an enforcement role for the INS,
by judging whether an applicant had violated the immigration laws and punishing him or her
by denial of employement if he or she was 'found guilty.'" Immigration Reform: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1981) (prepared statement of Arthur Flemming,
Chairman, United States Commission on Civil Rights) [hereinafter 1981 House Hearings]
(quoted in Comment, Immigration Reform: Solving the "Problem" of the Illegal Alien in the
American Workforce, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 223, 232 n.62 (1985)).
6. Testifying before Congress, representatives of the League of United Latin American
Citizens expressed the fear that sanctions would lead to increased discrimination against
Hispanics. 129 CONG. REC. S6967 (daily ed. May 18, 1983) (cited in Comment, supra note 5
at 223, 246 n. 181). A spokesman for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund (M.A.L.D.E.F.) also testified that Hispanic Americans may be mistaken for nonAmerican residents, and would therefore be subjected to a higher risk of discrimination. Joint
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House
Comm. on the Judiciaryand the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1982) (statement of Anatonia Hernandez,
Associate Counsel, M.A.L.D.E.F.).
7. The United States Commission on Civil Rights, in considering an earlier version of the
bill, voiced its concern that sanctions would "increase employment discrimination against U.S.
citizens and legal permanent resident aliens who are racially or culturally identifiable with
major immigrant groups." 1981 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 268.
Furthermore, the American Bar Association objected to employer sanctions, as an
"unworkable ... and discriminatory procedure" for controlling undocumented immigration.
American Bar Association, HUMAN RIGHTS, Winter 1983, at 11.
8. Congressman Robert Garcia of New York, vocal in his stand that employer sanctions
will lead to discriminatory treatment of Hispanic Americans, asserted that "[a]s a shorthand
for a fair identification process, employers would turn away those who appear foreign, whether
by name, race or accent." Anti-DiscriminationProvsion of H.R.3080: Joint HearingBefore the
House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw and the Senate Subcomm.
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1985) (quoted in H.R. REP. No.
682, supra note 3, at 68).
Some members of Congress, however, have argued that the legislation provides adequate
protection against discrimination even without the antidiscrimination provision. These
members assert that sanctions can be avoided without producing discriminatory results
through the use of the "simple steps to verify worker status" contained in the uniform
verification process. Moreover, a Government Accounting Office study of the use of employer
sanctions in other countries showed little or no evidence of discriminatoy practices against
noncitizens. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, at 68.
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other minorities, and authorized aliens in response to the threat of
sanctions. These groups argue that "employers faced with the possibility of civil and criminal penalties will be extremely reluctant to hire
persons because of their linguistic or physical characteristics." 9 Congress thus included in the IRCA section 274B, 10 the antidiscrimination provision, to provide express protection against discrimination on
the basis of national origin or citizenship status. This antidiscrimination provision has provoked both controversy as to its necessity, given
the existence of other antidiscrimination legislation, and uncertainty
regarding its application.
This Comment will examine the antidiscrimination provision in
the context of its legislative history, its relationship to other antidiscrimination legislation, and its requisite standard of proof. The
authors' objectives are to examine the conflicting views concerning
section 274B's proper interpretation, and to determine whether this
Act does in fact constitute a substantial addition to existing civil
rights legislation.
Specifically, this Comment will focus on the following: (1) the
provision's origin and purpose; (2) its substantive aspects, including
prohibited employment practices and protected classes, as well as its
procedural enforcement mechanisms; (3) the provision's relationship
to existing antidiscrimination laws, including section 703 of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, with attention
to whether these laws adequately protect those classes contemplated
by section 274B; and (4) whether the provision calls for a disparate
impact or a disparate treatment standard of proof.
II.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

Congress viewed the antidiscrimination provision as a necessary
component of the IRCA and deemed the provision essential in order
9. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, at 68. Already several major cities have reported an
increase in the number of discrimination cases allegedly resulting from the enactment of
employer sanctions. Complaints include the harrassment of employees with Spanish surnames
to verify their legal status, threats of unjustified dismissals, and outright discriminatory firings
of "foreign looking" workers. Reinhold, Reaction to Immigration Bill Is Sharply Split, N.Y.
Times, October 16, 1986, at B 11,col. 1. The City of Chicago's Human Relations Commission
stated that it receives "about 15 complaints a day from ethnic residents who have been fired or
threatened with firings as a result of the new law." Moffet & Solis, Employers Must Verify the
Citizenship of All Workers Under Immigration Law, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1986, at 13, col. 1.
According to the New York Department of Social Services, "[M]ore than 64 cases of
discrimination related to the Act have been documented as well as numerous threats of
unjustified dismissals." Howe, Enforcement of Aliens Law Faulted, N.Y. Times, March 16,
1987, at Y9, col. 1.
10. Section 274B amends section 102A of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
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to counterbalance the potential negative effects of employer sanctions.
The purpose of employer sanctions is to remove unauthorized aliens
from the workforce and thus requires "legality of residence as a precondition to employment."" As the House Committee on Education
and Labor reported:
Because of this prohibition against employment of an unauthorized
alien, a job applicant is potentially subject to alienage discrimination. Employers will be required for the first time to ascertain the
immigration status of applicants. With this information an
employer who wants to discriminate against non-citizens will be
able to identify them. 3
Not only will this information be readily available to employers, but
the threat of sanctions will increase the likelihood that they will use
this information to target potential victims to discriminate against.
Employers, faced with civil and criminal penalties for hiring unauthorized aliens, may simply avoid individuals who are racially or culturally identifiable with major immigrant groups.' 4 Consequently,
employers might refuse to hire American citizens who appeared foreign or aliens authorized to work but who had not yet attained full
citizenship status.
The Act's sweeping amnesty provision further contributes to the
possibility of discriminatory employment practices against noncitizens. The amnesty provision grants millions of undocumented
aliens legal resident status and will allow them to remain in this country without requiring them to become United States citizens."' The
provision has thus broadened the base of potential citizenship discrimination victims, and further justifies the antidiscrimination provision's adoption.
With these factors contributing to an increased likelihood of
12. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 12.
13. Id. at 12.
14. See Reinhold, supra note 9, at B 11, col. 1.
15. According to the Census Bureau, the legalization or amnesty provision will offer legal
status to the approximately 3.5 to 6 million unauthorized aliens residing in the United States.
Pear, Bill Would Bar Hiring Illegal Workers and Give Several Million Legal Status, N.Y.
Times, October 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1. After application for legal status, these aliens face
approximately a seven to nine year residency requirement before full citizenship status can be
attained.
To achieve amnesty, an alien must prove that he entered the United States before January
1, 1982 and that he has resided here continuously since then. Aliens may apply for legal
status within the 18-month period commencing six months after the bill became law. The
alien then receives temporary resident status and must keep this status for 18 more months,
after which time, he has one year in which to apply for permanent resident status. After
receiving permanent resident status, the individual must then spend five additional years in the
United States before becoming eligible for citizenship. IRCA § 245A.
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employment discrimination, along with the belief that present law
provided inadequate protection, 16 Congress realized that "if there is
to be sanction enforcement and liability there must be an equally
available remedy if resulting employment discrimistrong and readily
17
nation occurs."

III.

UNFAIR IMMIGRATION-RELATED EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

The core provision of section 274B, titled "Unfair ImmigrationRelated Employment Practices," states that:
It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity to discriminate against any individual (other
than an unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or the
discharging of the individual from employment(A) because of such individual's national origin, or
(B) in the case of a citizen or intending citizen...
because of such individual's citizenship status.18

The provision protects not only citizens or nationals of the United
States, but also those aliens classified as "intending citizens." 19 The
statute defines this latter class to include aliens lawfully admitted for
temporary residence under the new legalization provision of the Act,
and aliens granted either asylum or refugee status.2" As a prerequisite
to protection under section 274B, these individuals must evidence "an
16. For a discussion of the scope of existing laws, see infra notes 36-71 and accompanying
text.
17. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 12. It is important to note that the antidiscrimination provision is a "complement to the sanctions provision and must be considered
in this context." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 87, reprintedin 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5840. The provision will provide protection only as long
as the sanctions are in effect. If the sanctions are repealed, the antidiscrimination provision
will expire. Moreover, if the Government Accounting Office finds that no significant
discrimination has occurred as a result of the sanctions, or that the antidiscrimination
provision itself has placed an "unreasonable burden on employers," the provision will be
repealed. Id.; see IRCA § 274A(a)(1).
18. IRCA § 274B(a)(1).
19. Id. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has pointed out that citizenship serves as a
symbol of loyalty to this country and that those aliens who refuse to declare an intention to
become citizens retain "primary duty and loyalty to a foreign country." Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979). Others argue that resident aliens, even though they have not
declared an intention to become citizens, have the same commitment to their community as do
United States citizens or those resident aliens classified as intending citizens; they have chosen
to reside in the United States and thus all have a comparable interest in their community's
political and economic well-being. Furthermore, the naturalization process does not
significantly increase loyalty-it merely serves as a formality by which an alien's commitment
is officially recognized. See generally Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the
Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1286, 1411-13 (1983).
20. IRCA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(i).
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intention to become a citizen of the United States through completing
21
a declaration of intention to become a citizen.
The IRCA further specifies certain exceptions from coverage.
The Act does not extend to "a person or other entity that employs
three or fewer employees, '22 or to claims of national origin discrimination covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 Additionally, claims
of citizenship status discrimination are excepted if United States citizenship is required "in order to comply with law, regulation, or executive order," or if it is required by a "federal, state, or local
government contract." 24 Furthermore, citizenship discrimination is
not unlawful if, in the judgment of the Attorney General, a citizenship requirement is "essential for an employer to do business with an
agency or department of the Federal, State, or local goverment. '' 25
Finally, the Act provides that it is not an unfair immigrationrelated employment practice for an employer to "prefer to hire,
recruit, or refer an individual who is a citizen or national of the
United States over another individual who is an alien if the two indi21. IRCA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(ii). The "intending citizenship" requirement will necessarily
have the effect of excluding certain classes of aliens from protection under this section. Not
only must the alien be a lawful resident, a refugee or an asylee who has formally declared his
intention to become a citizen, but he must also satisfy rigid qualifications and deadlines for the
naturalization process once he becomes eligible. Specifically, aliens who fail to complete their
application for naturalization within six months of eligibility will not attain "intending citizen"
status for the purposes of this section. Those aliens who became eligible for naturalization
before the effective date of the Act have only a six month period to apply, or similiarly forfeit
"intending citizen" protection. IRCA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I). Furthermore, an alien who has
made a timely application but has not achieved citizenship status within two years will not be
classified as an "intending citizen" under the Act. IRCA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II); see also
Kobdish & Swanson, Section 102 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: An
Analysis of the Act's Employment DiscriminationProvisions, in THE NEW SIMPsoN-RODINO
IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986, at 148, 159-62 (1986).
22. IRCA § 274B(a)(2)(A).
23. IRCA § 274B(a)(2)(B). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers all claims of
national origin discrimination involving employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1982). IRCA will affect only those employers with between three and fourteen
employees.
24. IRCA § 274B(a)(2)(C).
25. Id. The question of whether an employer may raise a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) affirmative defense remains open. An earlier version of the bill expressly
provided for such a defense. Kobdish & Swanson, supra note 21, at 156. The present bill,
however, is silent on the issue. Id.
Under Title VII, an employer may discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin if these characteristics are "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1982). Without express provision for such a defense, courts will be forced to confront the
question of whether a BFOQ defense will be applicable under the IRCA. See generally Taylor
& Scharf, Immigration Reform and the Federal Law of Employment Discrimination, in THE
NEW SIMPSON-RODINO IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986, at 202, 215-16 (1986); Kobdish &
Swanson, supra note 21, at 156-58.
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viduals are equally qualified." 2 6 Congress, therefore, has recognized a
right of an employer to favor citizens over noncitizens in initial
employment decisions, where both are equally qualified.2 7
The IRCA further provides for the creation of the Office of the
Special Counsel within the Department of Justice. The Special Counsel, to be appointed by the President, is charged with the primary
responsibility of prosecuting unfair immigration-related employment
claims.2" Procedurally, "any person alleging that the person is
adversely affected directly by an unfair immigration-related employment practice" 29 may file a charge with the Special Counsel. The Special Counsel will then investigate and determine whether "there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true" and decide
3
whether to file a formal complaint with an administrative law judge. 1
The Office of the Special Counsel is also empowered to conduct investigations and commence enforcement proceedings on its own
initiative.3 1
If the Special Counsel has not filed a complaint within one hundred and twenty days of receipt of the charge, the complainant may
bring an action directly before an administrative law judge.3 2 To state
a claim under this private right of action section, a plaintiff must
allege a "knowing and intentional discriminatory activity or a pattern
33
or practice of discriminatory activity.9
If a private litigant or the Special Counsel proves that an
employer engaged in an unfair immigration-related employment practice, the administrative law judge must issue a cease and desist
26. IRCA § 274B(a)(4).
27. Id. For a discussion of the legal problems posed in determining whether candidates
are "equally qualified," see Kobdish & Swanson, supra note 21, at 162-64; Taylor & Scharf,
supra note 25, at 212-13.
28. IRCA § 274B(c)(1). This section has elicited concern that bureaucratic confusion will
result from the creation of the Office of the Special Counsel. Enforcement of national origin
discrimination claims will now be divided between two agencies. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is presently charged with enforcing Title VII's prohibition
against national origin discrimination in cases involving employers with fifteen or more
employees. The Special Counsel, under the terms of the Act, is charged with acting upon
national origin discrimination claims against employers with four to fourteen employees, as
well as charges of discrimination based on citizenship status. This split of enforcement
authority may well lead to "disparate treatment for claimants with essentially identical
grievances." H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 47.
29. IRCA § 274B(b)(1).
30. IRCA § 274B(d)(l).
31. Id.
32. IRCA § 274B(d)(2).
33. Id. The proper interpretation of this language and the appropriate standard of proof
for actions commenced by both private litigants and the Special Counsel has been the subject
of considerable debate. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
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order.3 4 Such an order may, at the discretion of the adminstrative law
judge, include both remedial and punitive measures, including compliance with verification procedures, prospective record keeping, compensatory hiring, back pay, and fines.35
IV.

DOES SECTION

274B FILL

A VOID IN EXISTING LAW?

Perhaps the primary impetus for the passage of the antidiscrimination provision rests on the premise that existing law, specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196436 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
fails to provide sufficient protection for victims of unfair immigrationrelated employment practices. Some members of Congress as well as
representatives of the executive branch, however, have asserted that
the antidiscrimination provision is duplicative of existing law and
therefore unnecessary. a To assess whether section 274B does, in fact,
create a distinct cause of action, it is necessary to examine these con-

flicting views in the context of the protections afforded by Title VII
and section 1981.
A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

A majority of Congress viewed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as inadequate in this context,38 because it does not expressly
protect individuals from private employment discrimination based on
alienage or citizenship status. 39 The Senate Judiciary Committee, in
accord with this view, stated that:
It makes no sense to admit immigrants and refugees to this country, require them to work and then allow employers to refuse to
hire them because of their immigration (non-citizenship) status.
Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment discrimination based on alienage or non-citizenship status,
the committee is of the view that this instant legislation must do
34. IRCA § 274B(g)(2)(A).
35. IRCA § 274B(g)(2)(B). Specifically, the employer may be required to: 1) maintain
records for a period of up to three years, containing information regarding all applicants and
hired personnel; 2) hire individuals directly and adversely affected by the discriminatory
practices, with or without back pay; 3) pay a civil penalty of not more than one thousand
dollars plus attorney's fees for each individual discriminated against and a penalty of not more
than two thousand dollars for a second violation. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
37. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 46.
38. Id. at 12. The Committee on Education and Labor noted the "inadequacy of current
law to protect individuals from the potential act of discrimination that may uniquely arise
from the imposition of sanctions." Id.
39. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 69; H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 12; see also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331, 1334 (5th Cir. 1972) (Title VII has
limited reach.).
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Congress thus attempted to eliminate this perceived void in existing
law by the adoption of the antidiscrimination provision. Without this
provision, private employers could freely discriminate against noncitizens to avoid the threat of sanctions.
Critics of the antidiscrimination provision, however, argue that
any discriminatory employment practices resulting from the fear of
employer sanctions are already adequately addressed by the national
origin component of Title VII. Critics point out that although Title
VII does not expressly cover discrimination based on citizenship status, guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
address the issue. 41 These guidelines deem citizenship status discrimination a violation of Title VII when it has the "purpose or effect" of
discriminating on the basis of national origin.42
In the operation of these guidelines, critics argue that because
there is no meaningful distinction between "national origin discrimination" and "citizenship status discrimination," there is no reason for
an expansion of the existing protections. 43 Even assuming a distinction can be made, however, opponents assert that the distinction is
insignificant. The employer sanctions provision only prohibits hiring
undocumented aliens and, therefore, will not have a discriminatory
effect on the hiring of legal resident noncitizens.' Furthermore, if
discrimination occurred at all, it would be directed at "anyone who
seems foreign," and would thus fall within the ambit of Title VII's
national origin protections.45
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against "any
individual" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.46 The statute expressly protects "any individual," whether an
alien or a citizen, from employment decisions based on these illegiti40. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt.1, at 70.
41. Current EEOC guidelines provide: "In those circumstances, where citizenship
requirements have the purpose or effect of discrimination against an individual on the basis of
national origin, they are prohibited by Title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.5(a)(b) (1986).
42. Id.
43. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 47. Critics argue that "[i]t
is difficult to see
any practical distinction between citizenship discrimination and national origin discrimination.
The facts needed to prove discrimination on the basis of citizenship would stem from the same
source as those relied upon with respect to national origin discrimination claims." Id.

44. Id.
45. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 216.
46. Title VII provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
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mate considerations; however, the statute does not make discrimination on the basis of alienage or citizenship status illegal.
Furthermore, in the landmark case of Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 47 the Supreme Court held that the refusal to hire an
individual because of his noncitizenship status does not constitute discrimination on the basis of national origin under Title VII 8 The
FarahCourt stated that the "plain language of the statute" compelled
its decision.4 9 The Court explained that the term "national origin"
refers to "the country where a person was born or more broadly the
country from which his or her ancestors came." 50 According to the
Court, citizenship does not fall within this definition.51 Furthermore,
the Court asserted that "the statute's legislative history, though quite
meager, fully supports this construction," as Congress, in its debates,
never discussed citizenship as falling within the meaning of national
origin discrimination. 2 Moreover, in light of the fact that Congress
requires United States citizenship as a precondition for employment
in certain federal jobs, it could not have intended to prohibit private
employers from imposing a citizenship requirement. 3
The Supreme Court did recognize, as reflected in present Equal
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
47. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
48. Id. at 95. The plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, brought suit against the Farah
Manufacturing Company alleging that the company's refusal to hire her because she was not
an American citizen violated Title VII's national origin component. The district court held
that citizenship discrimination constituted national origin discrimination under Title VII. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the term
"national origin" did not pertain to citizenship. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the Fifth Circuit in an 8-1 decision. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 343 F. Supp. 1205
(W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
49. Farah, 414 U.S. at 88.
50. Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 88-89. The only direct definition given the phrase "national origin" is the
following remark made on the floor of the House of Representatives by Congressman
Roosevelt, chairman of the house subcommittee that reported the bill: "'It means the country
from which you or your forebears came .... You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia,
England, France, or any other country.'" Id. at 89 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964)).
53. In justifying this position, the Court stated that "to interpret the term 'national origin'
to embrace citizenship requirements would require us to conclude that Congress itself has
repeatedly flouted its own declaration of policy. This court cannot lightly find such a breach of
faith." Farah,414 U.S. at 90-91.
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Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines,5 4 that there are
instances when the Title VII national origin component will prohibit
discrimination on the basis of citizenship. This protection, however,
is available only if the citizenship discrimination has "the purpose or
effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. '5 5 In Farah,
however, the Court found that it had not been confronted with such a
claim. The plaintiff, a lawfully admitted resident alien, had been
denied employment not because of her Mexican national origin, but
rather because she had not yet become a United States citizen.5 6
Thus, after the Farah decision, an employer could legitimately
refuse to hire lawfully admitted aliens based on their lack of United
States citizenship. Federal courts have strictly applied the Farah
holding, and have narrowly read the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines prohibiting pretextual citizenship requirements.57 Prior to the 1986 antidiscrimination provision, an alien
could prevail in his citizenship discrimination claim only by meeting a
heavy burden of proof: that his employer's citizenship requirement
was merely a pretext for discriminating on the basis of national origin.
54. For the most recent EEOC guidelines, see supra note 41. The Court refused to accept
an earlier version of the guidelines which suggested that citizenship discrimination always has
the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. This earlier interpretation of Title
VII's national origin component stated:
Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discriminating
on the basis of national origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who is domiciled or
residing in this country may not be discriminated against on the basis of his
citizenship ....
29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1972). The Court held that this guideline "was entitled to great deference" but that it need not defer to an "administrative construction of a statute where there are
'compelling indications that it is wrong.'" Farah,414 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
55. 414 U.S. at 92.
56. Id. at 93. The Farah Manufacturing Company had a policy of hiring only American
citizens, but did not discriminate on the basis of Mexican national origin. Over 96% of
Farah's employees at its San Antonio factory were of Mexican ancestry; in fact 97% of those
who occupied the position for which Ms. Espinoza applied were also of Mexican ancestry.
Furthermore, the worker hired in place of the plaintiff was a citizen with a Spanish surname.
Thus, Farah's citizenship requirement did not have the purpose or effect of discriminating
against persons of Mexican origin. Id. at 92-93.
57. The Ninth Circuit, citing Farah, denied recovery to lawfully admitted aliens for a
reverse discrimination charge and asserted that they "have no legal right or entitlement either
to be hired by private employers or to be free of discrimination on the basis of alienage when
seeking private employment." Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir.
1975). Similarly, a federal district court applied the Farah holding, by analogy, to a claim of
alienage and national origin discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. The court held that a
citizenship requirement does not constitute national origin discrimination unless the plaintiff
can prove the requirement was "a pretext for national origin discrimination." Espinoza v.
Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 522 F. Supp. 559, 568 (E.D. Va. 1981); see also Thomas v.
Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("national origin" means "place
of birth," not alienage).
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The antidiscrimination provision, therefore, does fill a void in
Title VII protection. Employers can no longer use a citizenship
requirement to discriminate. Furthermore, employees need not prove
that an employer's citizenship requirement was pretextual to secure
the new provision's benefits. Under this new provision, citizens and
noncitizens now have a statutory cause of action to challenge citizenship-based discriminatory hiring practices. The provision, therefore,
creates a substantive employment right for a previously unrecognized
and unprotected class of potential discrimination victims.
B.

Section 1981

Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code, which has its
origin in the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens."' 58 Opponents of the antidiscrimination provision cite this
section as support for their argument that existing civil rights legislation adequately protects aliens from citizenship discrimination.5 9 On
a closer analysis, however, it is apparent that this section does not
effectively prohibit private discrimination on the basis of citizenship.
As section 1981 was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery, it is well-settled
that the section applies to state and private racial discrimination.'
The Supreme Court has also extended section 1981 protection to
alienage discrimination involving state action. 6 The Supreme Court,
however, has yet to rule on whether section 1981 extends to private
discrimination on the basis of alienage,6 2 and thus the issue has been
left to the lower federal courts, which remain divided.
While several district courts have extended section 1981 protection to cover private alienage discrimination,6 3 the majority of lower
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
59. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 216.
60. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-72 (1976) (section 1981 reaches
private acts of racial discrimination); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454, 459-60 (1975) (Section 1981 "affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race.").
61. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971) (holding that section 1981 extends
"to aliens as well as to citizens" where there is state action); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948) (holding that section 1981 "and the Fourteenth

Amendment on which it rests in part protect 'all persons' against state legislation bearing
unequally upon them either because of alienage or color").
62. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court expressly declined to address this
issue, stating that it was "neither raised before the courts below nor presented in the petition
for a writ of certiorari." 414 U.S. 86, 96 n.9 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Co., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974) (section
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federal courts insist that section 1981 only applies to private and state
racial discrimination and state alienage discrimination." The Fifth

Circuit, in Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Co., 65 was the first to
extend section 1981 protection to private alienage discrimination.
Confronted with an employment discrimination claim brought by a
Mexican citizen, the court reasoned that if section 1981 applies to
private and state racial discrimination and state alienage discrimina-

tion, then consistency dictates reading the section to apply to private
alienage discrimination as well.66
It is important to point out, however, that the plaintiff in Guerra

was Hispanic, an ethnicity often associated with race. 67 Serious questions are raised, therefore, as to whether the Guerra court, and others
in accord, are invoking section 1981 to protect against alienage discrimination, or whether in fact their decisions are based on racial concharacterized
siderations. 68 The Fifth Circuit itself has subsequently
69
Guerra as having "strong racial overtones."
1981 extends to private alienage discrimination); Espinoza v. Hiliwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 522
F. Supp. 559, 561 (E.D. Va. 1981) (asserting in dicta that an allegation of private housing
discrimination based on citizenship states "a viable claim under Section 1981"); Ortega v.
Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135, 138-39 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (holding that section 1981 extends to
private discrimination against aliens as well as blacks in insurance sales).
64. See, e.g., DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp.
1121, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that section 1981's legislative history requires a finding
that private discrimination on the basis of citizenship is not within the section's protection;
only private and state racial discrimination and state alienage discrimination are covered);
accord Ben-Yakir v. Gaylinn Assocs., 535 F. Supp 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
65. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 653-54. In further support of its holding, the court referred to section 1981's
legislative history and the fact that Congress explictly "broadened the language of the portion
of the 1866 Act that has become Section 1981 to include 'all persons' in order to bring aliens
within its coverage." Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).
67. See Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); Ortiz v. Bank
of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Cubas v. Rapid American Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to provide guidance to the lower courts on
the proper scope of section 1981 when it reviews Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784
F.2d 505 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986), and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986). These companion cases present the
Court with the question of whether Arabs and Jews are protected under sections 1981 and
1982. See generally Comment, Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982:
Shifting the Focusfrom RacialStatus to Racist Acts, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823 (1987) (Race is
a subjective concept; the courts should look to whether the discrimination was racial in nature
rather than attempting to define race when determining the scope of coverage under sections
1981 and 1982.).
68. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 674 (N.D. Il. 1984)
(asserting that "the courts are merely viewing Hispanics as a distinct race; and invoking the
statutory [section 1981] protections against racial discrimination").
69. Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 933 (1982). It is also interesting to note that in Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., a
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It remains to be seen whether other circuits will follow the Fifth
Circuit and extend section 1981 protection to private alienage discrimination. Nonetheless, until the Supreme Court speaks on the
question, victims of alienage discrimination cannot rely on section
1981 to redress their claims.7 0
C. Section 274B's Contribution
The antidiscrimination provision creates a distinct cause of
action, omitted from Title VII, and of an uncertain status under section 1981. Several factors, however, may limit the utility of section
274B to many potential discrimination victims and thus reduce its
overall significance.
First, it is important to note that during congressional deliberations section 274B was seen as a complement to employer sanctions. 7'
Discrimination claims were thought to be actionable only if the discrimination resulted from an employer's reaction to the threat of
sanctions. If courts or the Special Counsel place emphasis on this
interpretation, the end result would be to exempt substantive violations of the provision that are not related to employer sanctions.
Strongly militating against this interpretation, however, is the fact
that the IRCA does not provide for such an affirmative defense; to
escape liability, an employer cannot claim, under any express provision of the Act, that his actions were unrelated to employer
72
sanctions.
Second, the "intending citizen" requirement will necessarily limit
the number of potential discrimination victims who may bring a claim
under the new provision. Many legal permanent resident aliens and
temporary legal residents live and work in the United States, without
intending to become citizens. Furthermore, temporary agricultural
workers similarly do not intend to become citizens. These classes of
district court extended section 1981 protections to alienage discrimination, but characterized
the plaintiff as a " 'brown-skinned resident alien of Hispanic (Mexican) origin.' " 433 F. Supp.
135, 137 (N.D. I1l. 1977). This characterization indicates that race may have been a factor in
the court's decision.
70. As to national origin discrimination, courts have generally found that such
discrimination lies outside the scope of section 1981, and that national origin plaintiffs must
proceed under Title VII. See, e.g., Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865, 867
(D. Ariz. 1975) (allegation of discrimination based on national origin not within scope of
section 1981); Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no
need to extend section 1981 to national origin discrimination as Title VII is sufficient
protection); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (section 1981 "limited
to racial discrimination" and does not cover national origin discrimination).
71. See supra note 14.
72. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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aliens have the legal status necessary to remain in the United States,
yet they are still vulnerable to discrimination. Given the fact that
Congress has, in the same law, generously provided amnesty to a large
number of undocumented aliens, it appears inconsistent that it did not
extend commensurate protection against discrimination for all
authorized aliens.
Whether the section actually contributes significantly to existing
civil rights legislation is still open to debate. Neither Title VII nor
section 1981 adequately protects those individuals contemplated by
section 274B. Although section 274B expands existing employment
rights, it cannot be viewed as a sweeping civil rights provision because
the terms of the provision apply only to a narrow class and may be
limited to sanctions-related discrimination claims. Furthermore,
because of varying interpretations regarding the section's requisite
standard of proof, those expressly protected classes may, in actuality,
face formidable barriers to the successful prosecution of their discrimination claims. If the statute calls for a disparate impact standard of
proof, the level of difficulty in proving a discrimination claim is substantially reduced. Alternatively, if a disparate treatment model is
applicable, protected classes will face a significantly greater level of
difficulty in bringing their actions.
IV.

DISPARATE IMPACT V. DISPARATE TREATMENT

Members of Congress and representatives of the executive
branch, including the President, are engaged in a major debate concerning the appropriate standard of proof under section 274B. 73 The
controversy centers on the meaning of the language contained in the
Act's private right of action section, and whether that language gives
rise to a disparate impact or a disparate treatment standard of proof.
Specifically, the section states that a private litigant may bring an
activity
action if he alleges a "knowing and intentional discriminatory
74
activity."
discriminatory
of
practice
or
or a pattern
Parties on both sides of the debate concede that the "knowing
and intentional discriminatory activity" language is indicative of a
disparate treatment, or "intent" standard of proof.7" The "pattern or
73. The proper role of presidential signing statements in statutory construction depends on
a resolution of constitutional issues. For a discussion of these issues, see Comment, Judicial
Deference to the ChiefExecutive's Interpretationof the Immigration Reform and ControlAct of
1986 Antidiscrimination Provision: A Circumvention of ConstitutionallyPrescribedLegislative
Procedure, 41 U.

MIAMI

L. REV. 1057 (1987).

74. IRCA § 274B(d)(2).
75. Upon signing the bill into law, the President asserted that the meaning of "knowing
and intentional discrimination" is "self-evident." President's Statement on Signing S. 1200
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practice" language, however, raises significant questions as to whether
a demonstration of intent is required, or whether a plaintiff may proceed under the disparate impact theory, which does not require a
showing of intent.76 "Pattern or practice" actions are usually thought
to be a variant of disparate treatment actions." The fact that "pattern or practice" actions, however, share some of the characteristics
of disparate impact actions fuels the controversy as to the appropriate
standard of proof invoked by the term "pattern or practice."
Notwithstanding the importance of this issue, a fundamental
question exists as to whether the language contained in the private
right of action section narrows the scope of the Special Counsel's
right of action.7 8 The section's legislative history is interpreted by
some commentators as indicating that Congress intended to narrow
the private right of action, and therefore included the "knowing and
intentional" and "pattern or practice" language in that section.79 At
the same time, however, Congress may not have intended this language to apply to the Special Counsel's right of action, as the Special
Counsel section contains no such qualifying language.8 0
The debate over the appropriate standard of proof invoked by the
term "pattern or practice" must be analyzed in light of the disparate
impact and treatment models applicable under Title VII. Because the
two models have significant differences, and thus will greatly affect
litigants bringing claims under the section, a brief overview of how
each operates is appropriate. Additionally, the significance of the
term "pattern or practice" must be reconciled with these concepts.
A. Disparate Treatment
Plaintiffs complaining of intentional discriminatory treatment by
Into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1534, 1535 (Nov. 6, 1986) [hereinafter President's
Signing Statement]. The author of the antidiscrimination provision, Representative Barney
Frank, agrees with the President that the language invokes an "intent" standard of proof.
Statement and Supporting Documents Submitted by Rep. Frank for Inclusion in Record of
December 17, 1986 Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter Statement Submitted by Rep. Frank] (these documents
are available from Rep. Frank's Washington D.C. office).
76. For discussion of the appropriate interpretation of "pattern or practice," see infra
notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
77. C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, at A9 (1986) (Pattern or practice actions fall within the
disparate treatment theory.); Salomone, Title VI and the Intent/Impact Debate: A Critical
Look at "Coextensiveness", I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 16, 21 n.24 (1982) ("Pattern or practice
is actually a variant of the disparate treatment theory").
78. See infra notes 152-77 and accompanying text.
79. Statement Submitted by Rep. Frank, supra note 75, at 1.
80. IRCA § 274B(c)(1); see infra notes 152-77 and accompanying text.
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an employer proceed under a disparate treatment theory of recovery. s ' Under this theory, "proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
82
differences in treatment.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 3 the leading disparate treatment case, sets out "the order and allocation of proof"8' 4 in a disparate treatment action. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
must prove the following elements:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualification, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.8 5
Establishment of these elements gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination.8 6 The burden then shifts to
the employer "to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection. ' 87 The employer need not prove, however, that he was "actually motivated by the proffered reasons."8 8 To
rebut the presumption, he need only introduce evidence that raises a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his employment practices
89
were discriminatory.
81. For discussion of this concept, see L. MODJESKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES (1980 & Supp. 1986).
82. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(citation omitted).
83. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
84. Id. at 800; see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 254 (1981);
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
85. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted). The Court, however, stated
that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the
prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
86. Id. at 802. As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, the prima
facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors." 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
87. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. It must be noted that this burden is a burden of
production, and not of persuasion. The burden of persuasion always remains on the plaintiff.
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("[U]ltimate burden of persuading the trier of fact ... remains at
all times on the plaintiff.").
88. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (citing Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,
439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)).
89. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. The Court continued by stating that "if the
defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is
rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Id. at 255.
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If the employer succeeds in rebutting the presumption of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff next has the opportunity to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reasons
are merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.90 It is in this, the
third evidentiary stage, that proof of discriminatory intent must be
established.9" This may be accomplished through direct proof of
intentional discrimination or inferentially through statistical or other
92

evidence.

B.

DisparateImpact

The Supreme Court articulated the disparate impact standard of
proof in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.9" The disparate impact theory
focuses on employer actions that appear facially neutral but have discriminatory effects when statistically analyzed.94 This model is
generally the most easily satisfied, because it does not require that a
plaintiff prove that an employer acted with discriminatory intent in an
employment decision.9" Rather, the disparate impact theory focuses
on the "consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."' 96 Because a facially neutral employment practice may
adversely affect 97 one group more than another, and because proof of
90. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The plaintiff's burden of proving the
pretextuality of the proffered reasons, however, "now merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256.
91. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
92. Id. at 804-05. Other evidence to show pretext includes facts as to the employee's
treatment during her term of employment, an employer's reaction to the employee's civil rights
activities, the employer's general policy regarding minority employment, and whether the
employer's hiring standards are applied alike to members of all races. The McDonnell Douglas
Court also noted that statistics may be helpful in determining whether the employer's refusal
to hire an applicant "conformed to a general pattern of discrimination." Id.
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94. Id. at 429-30.
95. Id. at 432.
96. Id. The Court noted that the objective of Title VII was "the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 431. The
authors of Title VII, as the court reasoned, must have intended to proscribe "not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id.
97. The basis for the Court's recognition of the disparate impact theory lies in section
703(a)(2) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). This section makes it an unlawful
employment practice to "adversely affect" an employee's status "because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The "adversely affect" language suggested to the
Court that the consequences of discriminatory employment practices must be considered-as
opposed to focusing exclusively on an employer's intent to discriminate. See Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination,71 MICH L. REV. 59, 74 (1972).
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intent poses too great a burden on plaintiffs, 98 the Griggs Court ruled
that a showing of "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent" 99
is not dispositive.
To prove employment discrimination under Griggs, a plaintiff
must establish that a facially neutral employment practice had a substantial disparate impact on a protected class of which he is a membet.I0 The prima facie case is usually established through a statistical
analysis of the employer's labor force, which demonstrates that the
practice has resulted in a denial of equal employment opportunity to
persons in a protected class."' 1 The burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that the employment practice in question is justifiable as a "business necessity." 10 2 If the employer successfully establishes the "business necessity" of his employment practices, the
plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating the existence of an alternative practice that would not adversely affect the plaintiff's class.103
C.

Pattern or Practice

The term "pattern or practice" has its origin in Title VII's
enforcement provision. 1°I Section 707 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
authorizes the Attorney General to commence a civil action when he
has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons
is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the
pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the
98. Proving intent under the disparate treatment theory produced "a series of almost

insuperable difficulties, as individual cases became bogged down in the vagaries of fact-finding.
The potential law enforcement thrust of the statute was lost in the search for circumstantial
evidence that would reveal the employer's state of mind." Blumrosen, supra note 97, at 67.
99. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
100. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977).
101. See Hazelwood School Dist., 433 U.S. at 307-08; see also Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the use of statistics, see Hallock, The Numbers
Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REV. 5 (1977).
102. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The Griggs Court also noted that the employer must show
that "any given requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id.
at 432. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit, in Robinson v. Lorrilard Corp., stated that a court
must take the following factors into account when determining whether an employment
practice was justifiable as a business necessity: the safe and efficient operation of the business,
the contribution of the requirement to the purpose it is designed to serve, and whether there
are acceptable alternative policies or practices that would accomplish the business purposes for
which the requirement was instituted. 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
103. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1982).

1044

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1025

full exercise of the rights herein described.' °5
In 1972, Congress amended the statute to give the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission responsibility for prosecuting "pattern or
practice" suits against private employers."°6
The term "pattern or practice" is not defined in Title VII, but the
Act's legislative history provides guidance. During congressional
deliberations prior to the statute's adoption, Senator Humphrey
articulated the following definition: "[A] pattern or practice would be
present only where the denial of rights consists of something more
than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a
generalized nature.' 1 7 Courts are in general agreement, therefore,
that the term "pattern or practice" applies to employment discrimina10 8
tion that is "not an isolated or accidental or peculiar event.
0 9 the
In InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States,"
Supreme Court stated that "pattern or practice" suits focus on systemic employer discrimination against protected minority groups. 110
In a "pattern or practice" suit, the government has the burden of
proving that discrimination was an employer's "standard operating
1 11
procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice.''

A prima facie case is usually established through the use of statistical evidence indicating disproportionate minority representation in
105. Id.
106. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1982)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6).
107. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336-37 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 14,270 (1964)). Senator
Humphrey went on to say:
There would be a pattern or practice if, for example, a number of companies or
persons in the same industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of
motels or restaurants practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a
significant part of its system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in
acts prohibited by the statute.
The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a
single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice ....
Id.
The Teamsters Court, in discussing the term's significance, stated that "pattern or practice" was "not intended as a term of art, and the words reflect only their usual meaning." Id.
at 336-37 n.16. Courts have consistently followed this view in subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 433 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1964).
108. Ironworkers Local 86, 433 F.2d at 552 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 1037 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1960) (statement of Deputy Attorney
General Walsh)).
109. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
110. Id. at 336.
111. Id. (footnote omitted).
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an employer's labor force. 112 After presentation of the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the employer to defeat the government's
showing by demonstrating that its statistical proof is either "inaccurate or insignificant."' a The government need not, at the initial
stage, offer evidence of discrimination for each person for whom it
will ultimately seek relief. 1I4 As the Court stated, "[T]he proof of the
pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy
was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." 15 The burden then
to hire a particular
shifts back to the employer to show that his refusal
16
applicant was based on legitimate reasons.'
V.

THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION

A.

274B

The President's Position

In a public statement upon signing the bill, President Reagan
expressly rejected the use of the disparate impact standard of proof
under the IRCA. 17 Pointing to the "knowing and intentional" and
"pattern or practice" qualifying language in the private right of action
section, the President asserted that all actions brought under section
274B, whether by the Special Counsel or a private litigant, "require a
'discriminatory intent' standard."' 1 8 According to the President, the
meaning of "knowing and intentional discrimination" is "self-evident," and the language "pattern or practice" is "taken from the
Supreme Court's disparate treatment jurisprudence" and thus also
requires proof of discriminatory intent.11 9
In describing this position's practical effects, the President made
the following statement:
[A] facially neutral employee selection practice that is employed
112. It is well-settled that statistics may be used to establish a prima facie case in "pattern
or practice" actions. See, e.g., United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592 F.2d 1088
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n of
Memphis, 497 F.2d 871, 875 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971).
113. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 360. In defense of her
actions, an employer may show that the allegedly discriminatory employment pattern is a
result of "pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination," or that too few
employment decisions were made to justify an inference that she engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination. Id. at 360.
114. Id. at 361-62. The government must focus only on establishing a pattern of
discriminatory employment decisions. Id. at 361.
115. Id. at 362.
116. Id.
117. President's Signing Statement, supra note 75, at 2.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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without discriminatory intent will be permissible under the provisions of section 274B. For example, the section does not preclude
a requirement of English language skill or a minimum score on an
aptitude test even if the employer cannot show a "manifest relationship" to the job in question or that the requirement is a "bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise," so long as the
practice is not a guise used to discriminate on account of national
origin or citizenship status.' 2 o
In the President's view, therefore, "unless the plaintiff presents
evidence that the employer has intentionally discriminated on proscribed grounds, the employer need not offer any explanation for his
employee selection procedures."1 21 In his statement, the President
has articulated a limited view of a section 274B cause of action. This
position stands in sharp contrast to Title VII which permits a plaintiff
to proceed under the disparate impact or disparate treatment theories
of recovery.
B.

CongressionalOpposition

Reaction to the President's position on this issue has been strong.
Members of Congress, Hispanic groups, and civil rights advocates
assert that the President's interpretation of the provision is too narrow.122 Representative Barney Frank, a primary author of the section, argues that the President's interpretation is in conflict with the
language of the statute and its legislative history. 23 Representative
Frank has taken the position that "pattern or practice" suits do not
require proof of discriminatory intent, and therefore the President's
24
imposition of an intent requirement is unwarranted.
According to this argument, the private action's "pattern or
practice" language refers to "intentional, regular, OR repeated violations." 25' The term "intentional" is only one category, "listed in the
120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Pear, Immigration Law Sets Off Dispute over Job Rights for Legal Aliens, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1-2. Representative Esteban Edward Torres, Chairman of the

Congressional Hispanic Caucus, stated that he was "appalled at the President's interpretation
of the anti-discrimination provision." Id. E. Richard Larson, Vice President of the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, voiced his organization's view that "the
President's interpretation of the law would severely undercut the protections against
discrimination that Congress provided." Id.
123. See Implementation ofImmigration Reform and ControlAct of 1986: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. of the
Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Subcomm. Hearings].
124. Statement Submitted by Rep. Frank, supra note 75, at 1.
125. Id. (referring to Documents #2 and #3). In Document #2, entitled Modifications to
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disjunctive," leaving both "regular" and "repeated" violations actionable without requiring the plaintiff to prove an employer's discriminatory intent. 126 Thus, the private right of action section provides for
two separate and distinct causes of action: the first, involving "knowing and intentional discriminatory activities," invokes the disparate
treatment theory of recovery; the second, concerning "pattern or
practice" violations, invokes the disparate impact theory of recovery. 127 Interpreting "pattern or practice" as invoking the disparate
treatment theory renders the term superfluous. 2 '
It is further argued that the "pattern or practice" language
invokes the disparate impact theory of recovery, because both "pattern or practice" cases as well as disparate impact cases focus on the
consequences of discriminatory employment practices, rather than on
an employer's intent to discriminate.129 Both seek to identify and
remedy patterns of employment practices that, when statistically ana130
lyzed, show discriminatory effects on a protected minority group.
Thus, the similarities between the underlying purposes of both disparate impact and "pattern or practice" cases, along with the private
right of action's legislative history, serve as the basis for critics' opposition to the President's interpretation.
C. An Analysis of the Controversy
The decision as to which standard of proof governs the private
right of action section will be critical in analyzing the section's overall
contribution to existing civil rights legislation. If the courts permit
private litigants claiming discrimination based on national origin or
the Frank Amendment Proposed by Mr. Mazzoli and/or Mr. Frank, Item 2 is a proposal to
"Limit the Private Right of Action to 'Pattern or Practice' Discriminatory Activity." This

section called for "Statutory Language [that] will make it clear that 'pattern or practice' means
that the conduct must be more than an isolated, accidental departure from otherwise nonviolative practices; rather, intentional, regular, or repeated violations of the rights granted
under the statute must be shown." Document #3 is a memorandum submitted by Rep.

Frank's assistant to Senator Simpson proposing the same.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2; see also Kobdish & Swanson, supra note 21, at 173.

128. In testimony before Congress, Rep. Frank asserted that the Justice Department's
interpretation of the "pattern or practice" language as requiring proof of intent would, in

effect, reduce the language to "excess verbiage." 1986 Subcomm. Hearings,supra note 123, at
88.
To counter Rep. Frank's position, a spokesman for the Justice Department asserted that
"knowing and intentional" refers to a single act of discrimination, while "pattern or practice"
goes to the "repeated nature of the act" but also requires intentional discrimination. Thus, the
"pattern or practice" language is not superfluous. Id. at 89.
129. Kobdish & Swanson, supra note 21, at 176.
130. For analysis of "pattern or practice" and disparate impact, see supra notes 93-116 and
accompanying text.
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citizenship status to bring their actions without requiring proof of
subjective discriminatory intent, then the courts are invoking the disparate impact theory.'
If, as the President asserts, a plaintiff must
prove discriminatory intent, directly or inferentially, then the disparate treatment theory is applicable. 3 2 The disparate treatment standard of proof, according to the President, applies to private actions
brought under 274B, whether a plaintiff alleges a "knowing and intentional" or a "pattern or practice of discriminatory activity.' 33 On a
closer analysis, the President's position appears consistent with the
provision's purpose, its legislative history, and judicial construction of
the term "pattern or practice."
The underlying purpose of section 274B is to counter the potential discriminatory effects that may result from the imposition of sanctions. 134 Congress feared that employers, threatened with penalties
for hiring unauthorized aliens, would purposely avoid hiring anyone
who appeared or sounded foreign. An employer's refusal to hire these
applicants would be a conscious and deliberate effort to avoid sanctions; thus such discriminatory practices are aptly termed "inherently
intentional."'' 3' The argument that only an intent standard of proof
applies to this section, therefore, appears consistent with the purpose
136
of the antidiscrimination provision.
Moreover, those opponents of the President's position who argue
that proof of intent is not necessary in "pattern or practice" actions
have failed to take note of the House Committee on the Judiciary's
report accompanying the bill.' 37 The report states that the term
"'pattern or practice' has received substantial judicial construction,"
13
and that the committee intended to follow a particular line of cases, 1
39
including InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,1
a disparate treatment case. These cases indicate that the term "pattern or practice" applies to "regular, repeated and intentional activi131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
United
136.

See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
President's Signing Statement, supra note 75, at 2.
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
1986 Subcomm. Hearings,supra note 123, at 62 (statement by Mark Disler, Assistant
States Attorney General).
Regulations proposed by the Department of Justice, with respect to the

implementation of this provision, are in accord with this view. See Unfair ImmigrationRelated Employment Practices, 52 Fed. Reg. 9,274 (1987) (proposed Mar. 23, 1987) (to be

codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 44).
137. H.R. REP. No. 682, pt. 1, supra note 3, at 59.
138. Id. The House Committee on the Judiciary cited United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d
153 (5th Cir. 1964); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1976); and

United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 438 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1971). Id.
139. 431 U.S. 324 (1976).
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ties, but does not include isolated, sporadic or accidental acts."' 4
Thus, the House Committee on the Judiciary has been explicit in its
definition of "pattern or practice": the language under this provision
applies only to widespread, intentional discriminatory activities and
invokes the disparate treatment theory of recovery.
In addition, the proposed language that would have defined "pattern or practice" as "intentional, regular or repeated" violations was
never incorporated into the provision.1 4 1 These same categories, originally listed in the disjunctive during conference negotiations, are now
listed in the conjunctive in the final version of the House Committee
on the Judiciary report.' 42 This expression of congressional intent
demonstrates that "pattern or practice" actions require a showing of
the regular and repeated nature of the violations and the employer's
discriminatory intent. If both the provision's underlying purpose and
the committee report's definition of "pattern or practice" are also
considered, it must be conceded that Congress, by its own doing, has
set the standard for "pattern or practice" actions as requiring proof of
intent.
Although the legislative history points to the conclusion that the
term "pattern or practice" invokes the disparate treatment standard
of proof, opposition to this interpretation is understandable. "Pattern
or practice" and disparate impact cases are similar; at the prima facie
level both utilize statistical evidence to demonstrate disproportionate
minority representation in an employer's workforce.'43 "Pattern or
practice" actions, utilizing the disparate treatment standard of proof,
however, also use statistical evidence at the prima facie level to raise a
rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination.'" Although
disparate treatment actions usually require satisfaction of the four
prima facie elements set out in McDonnell Douglas,'45 the Teamsters
Court noted that in "pattern or practice" actions, McDonnell Douglas
"did not purport to create an inflexible formulation."' 46 The significance of McDonnell Douglas rests "not in its specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the
general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial bur140. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 59. Although this definition is related
primarily to the Act's criminal penalties provision for hiring unauthorized aliens, the report
specifies that "the same interpretation . . . shall apply . . . for certain unfair immigration-

related employment practices." Id.
141. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

142. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 59.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra note
Teamsters, 431
See supra note
Teamsters, 431

112 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 335 n.15.
85 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 358.
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den of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act."' 47 Because the House Committee on the Judiciary
cited Teamsters as the standard for "pattern or practice" actions
brought under this section, the disparate treatment model, with its
intent element, is the operative standard for private litigants.
Further controversy centers on the perceived difficulties of satisfying the intent element under the disparate treatment standard of
proof. These perceived difficulties stem from the misconception that
direct proof of intent is essential in all "pattern or practice" actions. 148
In fact, proof of intent in "pattern or practice" cases need not be
direct or actual; an inference of intent established by the plaintiff in
rebuttal is sufficient to defeat an employer's defense. '4 9 This inference
is usually established by a statistical analysis of the discriminatory
effects on an employer's workforce.' 5° Although the intent standard
appears to be exacting, the fact that intent may be established through
an inference, based on statistical evidence, lessens the plaintiff's
burden.
VI.

SPECIAL COUNSEL'S RIGHT OF ACTION

The "knowing and intentional" and "pattern or practice" language is not present in the Special Counsel section. The President has
apparently taken the language of the private right of action, a procedural section, and concluded that this language also substantively
restricts the Special Counsel's right of action. The disparate treatment model, according to the President, is the only theory of recovery
available, not only for private litigants, but also for actions commenced by the Special Counsel.151
The President, in justifying this position, stated that "[s]ection
274B tracks only the language of paragraph (1) of section 703(a) [of
Title VII], the basis of the 'disparate treatment' . . . theory of recov'
ery." 152
The use of the disparate impact standard "would be
147. Id.
148. 1986 Subcomm. Hearings,supra note 123, at 113. During subcommittee testimony,
Mark Disler of the Justice Department stated that opposition to the President's interpretation
stems from the fact that "some members of [Congress] ... feel that the intent standard is a
narrower standard than it actually is .... ." Id. at 62. Mr. Disler explained that
"discriminatory effects can be used to identify intent" through a statistical analysis of an
employer's labor force. Id. at 63. Representative Barney Frank later conceded that he was, in
fact, "too literally reading the President's statement." Id. at 103.
149. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. President's Signing Statement, supra note 75, at 2.
152. Id.
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improper," as paragraph 2 of section 703(a), the basis of the disparate
15 3
impact model, "does not have a counterpart in section 274B.'
The President's analysis of the Special Counsel's right of action
by reference to the private right of action section has been characterized as "a grave error."' 5 4 The legislative history, according to one
view, supports the argument that Congress intended the scope of the
private action to be smaller than that of the Special Counsel.' 5 5 The
scope of the Special Counsel's right of action, however, is not limited
merely to actions alleging "knowing and intentional" discrimination
or a "pattern or practice" of discrimination.
In support of this argument, proponents point out that the earlier
version of the provision passed by the House of Representatives in
1984 did not qualify either the Special Counsel's right of action or the
private right of action."5 6 In a 1984 conference, however, objections
as to the coterminous scope of the two rights of action resulted in a
narrowing of the private right of action. 57 The compromise language, "knowing and intentional" and "pattern or practice," was
inserted in the private action and survives in the statute's present
form. By qualifying the private right of action, however, the Special
Counsel is left with the right to bring an action without alleging
"knowing and intentional" discrimination or a "pattern or practice"
of discriminatory activity.
The issue thus becomes what standard of proof is applicable in an
action commenced by the Special Counsel, and what impact, if any,
will a determination that the disparate impact model is "inappropriate"1 58 have on the viability of a section 274B claim. As one opponent
argued, affording section 274B claimants the right to bring an action
only under the disparate treatment standard of proof sets "a dangerous precedent for civil rights law. The effect is to say that normal
to
civil rights protections against job discrimination don't apply
' 59
aliens, resulting in an unequal, dual system of enforcement.'
Although it is apparent that following the President's interpretation would indeed set a "dangerous precedent"' 6 for civil rights law,
given the fact that litigants under Title VII may utilize both the dispa153. Id. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
154. Statement Submitted by Rep. Frank, supra note 75, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. President's Signing Statement, supra 75, at 2.
159. Pear, supra note 122, at 1, col. 1-2 (quoting Arnold Leibowitz, former Senate Counsel
on Immigration).
160. Id.
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rate treatment and impact theories, the President's position is soundly
based on legislative history and the overall statutory scheme of section
274B. This interpretation, therefore, must be given deference.
Section 274B's purpose is to prohibit intentional discriminatory
acts on the basis of an individual's national origin or citizenship status.1 6 ' The provision was not intended to target facially neutral
employment practices that, even when objectively applied, have an
adverse impact on a protected class. The provision, a complement to
employer sanctions, was a compromise to alleviate congressional fear
that sanctions would cause employers to discriminate against legal
resident aliens and national origin groups. 162 Thus, the provision
targets only intentional discriminatory acts.
Moreover, the assertion that by qualifying the private right of
action with the "knowing and intentional" and "pattern or practice"
language leaves the Special Counsel with the right to bring an action
without having to prove intent is an inconsistent attempt to justify a
broader right of action for the Special Counsel. Congressional opponents argue that the President's interpretation of the private right of
action as involving only the disparate treatment theory is erroneous.
They assert that both the disparate impact and treatment theories are
appropriate for private litigants. 163 At the same time, however, these
opponents insist that they intentionally narrowed the private right of
action because of objections to the coterminous scope of the private
and Special Counsel rights of action. IM
If it is accepted that Congress narrowed the private right of
action, however, the argument that a private litigant can bring an
action on a disparate impact theory fails. If the private action was in
fact narrowed, the only remaining theory is disparate treatment. Furthermore, if the disparate treatment theory is the only theory available to private litigants, then according to this argument Congress has
vested the Special Counsel with a broader right of action than a private plaintiff's right of action. Such a conclusion departs from the
traditional notion that the ultimate right to vindicate a claim remains
with the individual.
Congress enacted the antidiscrimination provision to protect
individual rights, and thus a broader right of action could not have
been delegated to the executive branch. To vest the Special Counsel
with the power to bring both disparate treatment and disparate
161. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 156-57.
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impact actions, when a private litigant could bring only a disparate
treatment action, would, in many cases, foreclose a private plaintiff
from securing redress should the Special Counsel decide not to institute an action based on a plaintiff's complaint. Congress could not
have intended to set up such a dual system of enforcement. If the
private right of action is limited to the disparate treatment standard of
proof, the Special Counsel's right of action must face the same
limitation.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the intent standard is
that the language of section 274B tracks only section 703(a)(1) of
Title VII, the basis of the disparate treatment standard of proof.16 5
The antidiscrimination provision makes it unlawful to "discriminate
... against any individual ...because of such individual's national
origin . . . or citizenship status." 1 66 Similarly, section 703(a)(1) of
Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate "because of . . . race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. "167 The "because of" language,
in both statutes, is recognized by courts as "traditional intent language" 1 68 and invokes the disparate treatment theory.
Furthermore, missing from section 274B is paragraph 2 of section 703(a) of Title VII. This paragraph makes it unlawful for an
employer to "adversely affect an employee's status because of his race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."'' 69 The "adversely affect" language is generally recognized as the basis for the disparate impact
theory.1 70 This language suggested to the Griggs Court that the focus
of a discrimination claim should be on the effects or consequences 1 of
71
an employer's action and not on the employer's underlying intent.
In fact, as one scholar noted, "applying the principle of liberal con' 72
struction," as done by the Griggs Court, "requires an anchor."'
That anchor, paragraph 2 of section 703(a) of Title VII, is not present
in section 274B.
The argument in favor of a disparate impact theory is thus
unsupported by the statutory scheme of section 274B, its legislative
history, and purpose. The argument may, however, have a persuasive
effect on courts interpreting this legislation. Allowing a plaintiff to
proceed under either the disparate impact or treatment theory is con165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
IRCA § 274B(a)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 123, at 63.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See Blumrosen, supra note 97, at 74.
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sistent with traditional civil rights legislation. Congress granted citizens, intending citizens, and national origin groups statutory
protection against discrimination. To deny them the right to redress
their claims under either the disparate impact or treatment theory
leads to the conclusion that Congress may not have viewed these individuals as being entitled to the same protections afforded to other
minority groups in the United States under Title VII. Because section
274B borrows much of its language from Title VII, and because of the
inconsistencies in the statute and ambiguities in its legislative history,
reviewing courts will ultimately have to decide the issue.
Courts have consistently sought to construe Title VII's language
as broadly as possible to make the statute effective in eradicating discriminatory employment practices. 173 A reading of Title VII gives the
appearance that proof of intent is essential. 174 The Supreme Court,
however, in Griggs, held that proof of intent is not required in all Title
VII actions. 175 A plaintiff, under Title VII, may use either the disparate impact or treatment theory.
Title VII's legislative history is regarded "only as an outer limit,
not as a guide, apparently based on the premise that the courts [are]
available to prevent serious error.' 1 76 The courts, as the ultimate
arbiter, must determine if a "serious error" has been made and devise
an appropriate solution. The fact that Title VII and section 274B
have ostensibly similar purposes, and closely parallel language,
strongly suggests that the same standard of proof should apply to
both Title VII and section 274B plaintiffs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The antidiscrimination provision is Congress's attempt to combat the potential negative effects of employer sanctions. Employer
sanctions will impose severe penalties on employers who hire unauthorized aliens or who fail to verify their legal status. Because of the
difficulties of verifying an alien's legal status and the potential that
fraudulent working papers may become standard, employers may
purposely avoid hiring anyone who appears or sounds foreign. Congress, through employer sanctions, has, in fact, created an incentive
173. Id. at 110.
174. See Taylor & Scharf, supra note 21, at 209.

175. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
176. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-9,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (footnote omitted) quoted in Blumrosen, supra
note 97, at 110.
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for employers to discriminate on the basis of national origin and citizenship status.
Recognizing that existing law provided inadequate protections
from such discriminatory practices, Congress included the antidiscrimination provision in the IRCA. Title VII does not expressly
make discrimination on the basis of citizenship status illegal. Nor
does its national origin component adequately bring citizenship discrimination within its coverage. Furthermore, until the Supreme
Court speaks to the question, it remains uncertain whether section
1981 protections extend to alienage or national origin discrimination.
The antidiscrimination provision, therefore, creates a substantive
employment right for a previously unrecognized and unprotected
class of potential discrimination victims.
Congress, however, has limited this right. Congress has imposed
the "intending citizen" requirement and has left open the possibility
that claims under the provision are actionable only if they are related
to employer sanctions. Such limitations will seriously undermine the
provision's effectiveness in eliminating all citizenship and national origin discrimination. These limitations, moreover, substantially reduce
the provision's contribution to existing civil rights legislation.
Furthermore, because of the varying interpretations regarding
the section's requisite standard of proof, those expressly protected
classes may, in actuality, face formidable barriers to the successful
prosecution of their discrimination claims. The position in favor of a
disparate treatment standard of proof appears to be soundly based on
section 274B's legislative history and overall statutory scheme.
Courts will ultimately interpret this statute, however, and may very
well find that if Congress has taken steps to grant national origin
groups, citizens, and intending citizens protection against discrimination, this protection must be commensurate with that of other minority groups in the United States. To deny the same protection afforded
other minority groups is to perpetuate the notion that legal resident
aliens and national origin groups maintain an inferior status in the
United States and thus are not entitled to equal employment rights.
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